Mesaros v. United States – Case Brief
Mesaros v. U.S., 845 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Facts: Congress passed an act to allow for the minting of commemorative coins to raise funds for the Statue of Liberty. The United States Mint mailed advertising materials encouraging prospective purchasers to forward early payment for the coins. The order form included a line for the purchaser’s signature and stated that reservations received by December 31, 1985 would be entitled to a pre-issue discount of up to 16%.
Mesaros (P) forwarded her credit card order on November 26, 1985 for $1,675. Mesaros’ husband forwarded another order for 18 coins on December 30, 1985. Demand for the $5 coins was greater than expected and the coins were sold out before January 6, 1986. The Mint had only recently begun accepting payment via credit card and on February 18, 1986, Mesaros was informed that the Mint was unable to process her credit card order. In May 1986, Mesaros received the 18 coins ordered by check.
P filed suit seeking damages for breach of contract claiming jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. P contended that the materials sent to them constituted an offer and that a binding contract had formed. The trial court granted D’s motion to dismiss and P appealed.
Issue: Does an advertisement for the sale of goods constitute an offer?
Holding and Rule: No. A mere advertisement for the sale of goods is an invitation to trade and not an offer.
Materials mailed to prospective customers are merely advertisements or invitations to deal (Restatement (2d) Contracts 26).
Whether an offer was made depends on the objective reasonableness of the alleged offeree’s belief that the advertisement or solicitation was intended as an offer. Generally it is unreasonable for a person to believe that any advertisement is an offer that binds the advertiser. The order form asked in the permissive for the Mint to “Please accept my order.” If one party solicits and receives an order from another under the proviso of no acceptance until ratification, the solicitation is in fact a request for an offer.
In Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, the advertisement stated that a mink would be sold for $1, first come first served. The court held that that case was not applicable to these facts because the ad clearly identified both the item sold and the person to whom it would be sold; i.e. only one item would be sold for $1, first come first served. The court held that in this case, there was no proviso for first come first served and there were more coins ordered than there were available.
The court held that the ad was not an offer to sell and the response that P’s response to the ad was an offer.
Disposition: Affirmed.