Lonergan v. Scolnick - Case Briefs
Lonergan v. Scolnick, 129 Cal. App. 2d 179, 276 P.2d 8 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
Facts: Scolnick (D) sought to sell certain real property and placed the following ad in a Los Angeles paper: ‘Joshua Tree vic. 40 acres, . . . need cash, will sacrifice.’ Lonergan (P) answered the ad and Scolnick wrote to him describing the property and providing directions, and stated that his rock-bottom price was $2,500 cash.
Lonergan wrote to Scolnick to ask for details regarding the precise location of the property and to suggest an escrow agent “should I desire to purchase the land.” D wrote to P the next day and told him to decide quickly because he expected to have a buyer within a week. D sold the property four days later. Two days later P received D’s letter and the next day P wrote to D accepting the offer.
P sued D, alleging that D had breached a contract to sell the land. P claimed that the land was worth $6,081 and sought the difference between that and the asking price of $2,500. D denied that a contract had formed. The trial court favor of D and P appealed.
Issue: Must there be a manifestation of contractual intent in order to create an enforceable contract?
Holding and Rule: Yes. There must be a manifestation of contractual intent and it must be unequivocal and show that the parties intended to create a binding agreement.
There can be no contract unless there has been a meeting of the minds and the parties have mutually agreed upon some specific thing. This is usually evidenced by one party making an offer which is accepted by the other party. Section 25 of the Restatement of the Law on Contracts reads: ‘If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from the circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom the promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression of assent, he has not made an offer.’
The court held that the language used by D in his letters disclosed that they were not intended as an expression of fixed purpose to make a definite offer. The advertisement in the paper was a mere request for an offer. The letter of March 26 contained no definite offer because it merely gave further particulars and told P how to locate the property if interested. The letter of April 8 answered some questions asked by P, and stated that if P were really interested he would have to act fast. That D expected a buyer in a short time indicated that D intended to sell to the first-comer. P was not being given a right to act within a reasonable time after receiving the letter.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Notes: Manifestation of contractual intent is determined by the objective person standard of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the offeree.
See also: Raffles v. Wichelhaus (The Peerless Case).
Tags: case briefs, contract formation, Contracts, contractual intent, law, lawnix, Los Angeles, meeting of the minds, objective reasonable person standard, offer, real property
