Coleman v. Smith – Case Brief
Coleman v. Smith, 814 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1987).
Facts: Coleman (P) was appointed Special Investigator by the Board of Trustees of the Village of Robbins to investigate police corruption. His investigation led to mayor Marion Smith (D) who then fired Coleman without approval from the Board in order to suppress the investigation. Coleman sued the Village of Robbins, Smith, and Frierson, the chief of police, under 42 USC 1983. The Ds denied the allegations in their answer but were willfully delinquent during the discovery phase The judge imposed a default judgment as to liability against Ds as the sanction. After a trial on the issue of damages the jury entered a verdict for P for a total of more than $600,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
D made motions to set aside the verdict on various grounds including: res judicata; failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; and that P had no property or liberty interest in his employment. The judge denied the motions and Ds appealed.
Issues: 1) Is a default judgment available as a sanction for abuse of the discovery process? 2) Did the judge abuse his discretion in denying a FRCP 60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment?
Holding and Rule:
1) Yes. Default judgment is available as a sanction for abuse of the discovery process. FRCP 16(f) authorizes the sanction of judgment by default for noncompliance with discovery and pretrial orders, and the extreme circumstances of this case fully justified the trial judge’s imposition of that sanction.
2) No. Allowing relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires a “diligent, conscientious client.” Neither defendant met that test. Indeed, their argument can best be described as a desperate hindsight effort to shift their responsibility to their lawyer; it verges on the frivolous.
Disposition: Affirmed.
Notes: This case is occasionally cited incorrectly as Coleman v. Frierson.